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 ABSTRACT 
 
Portnoy, S. (2019). Memory-Based Approaches to the Examination of 
Alibis Provided by Innocent Suspects. Department of Psychology, Uni-
versity of Gothenburg. 
 
The aim of the current thesis was to extend research on suspect alibis by 
exploring how the process of providing alibis may be improved for in-
nocent suspects, for whom the provision of inaccurate and incomplete 
alibis may be detrimental. Across three experimental studies and one 
exploratory survey, I examined (i) whether memory-based reporting in-
structions enhance innocent mock suspects’ memory output when re-
porting past actions (Study I) and evidence that may corroborate their 
alibi (Study II); (ii) whether a presumption of guilt, communicated to 
innocent mock suspects by an interviewer prior to providing their alibi, 
affects their memory output (Study III); and (iii) the beliefs and 
knowledge of lay people about factors concerning the processes of alibi 
generation and provision (Study IV). In Study I (N = 192), innocent and 
guilty mock suspects provided an alibi, reporting about recently com-
pleted tasks. Prior to alibi provision, participants were asked to maxim-
ize their alibi accuracy, informativeness, or both; control participants 
were given no accuracy or informativeness instructions. Innocent mock 
suspects who were instructed to provide an accurate and informative al-
ibi provided the largest number of correct details compared with control 
participants. In contrast, for guilty mock suspects, neither the number of 
correct details nor the accuracy of the alibis differed as a result of pre-
alibi instructions. In Study II (N = 78), prior to providing an alibi, inno-
cent mock suspects were asked to report accurately and informatively 
about past actions during task completion or about past actions and cor-
roborating evidence. Control participants were asked only to report 
about their time while away from the lab. Results indicated that partici-
pants who were asked to report accurately and informatively about past 
actions, or about past actions and corroborating evidence, provided a 
larger number of correct details than control participants. However, in-
structions focused on accurate and informative reporting about past ac-
tions and corroborating evidence did not result in a larger number of 
correct details compared with instructions to report accurately and in-
formatively about past actions only. In Study III (N = 90), innocent 
mock suspects provided an alibi to an interviewer who communicated 
to them that she believed in their guilt or innocence, or had no belief 
about their involvement in a crime. Participants detected the inno-
cent/guilty presumption of the interviewer, but the number of correct 
details provided in their alibis did not differ across interviewer-belief 
conditions. Finally, in Study IV (N = 343), lay people from the United 
Kingdom, Israel, and Sweden responded to a series of questions regard-
ing their beliefs about the generation and provision of alibis. Participants 
tended to believe that innocent suspects do not provide inaccurate alibis, 
but that should this happen, memory errors may be the primary reason. 
Participants also tended to believe that interviewers begin to form their 
opinion of the guilt or innocence of suspects prior to or while hearing 
the suspects’ alibi for the first time, and that a presumption of guilt can 
affect how interviewers conduct interviews. The findings reported in the 
present thesis suggest that innocent suspects’ memory output may be 
increased using specific memory-based pre-alibi instructions. Guiding 
suspects to provide more correct information may result in innocent sus-
pects providing more forensically valuable information which may in 
turn promote their exoneration. The finding that participants detected 
the innocent/guilty presumption of the interviewer suggests that the ef-
fect of a presumption of guilt on innocent suspects’ alibis should be ex-
amined in longer interviewer-interviewee interactions. Lastly, the find-
ings of the survey demonstrate that lay people hold some mistaken be-
liefs about the ability of innocent suspects to provide accurate alibis. The 
current thesis demonstrates the merits of examining innocent suspects 
as a unique group of rememberers and basing such examination on 
memory theory.
SWEDISH SUMMARY 
 
Vid förhör med misstänkta är det vanligt att förhörsledaren ber den 
misstänkte redogöra för sina förehavanden då brottet begicks. En 
misstänkt som är oskyldig till brottet måste då försöka övertyga 
förhörsledaren om sin oskuld genom att ge ett alibi som bevisar att 
hen befunnit sig på en annan plats under den kritiska tidsperioden. 
För att göra detta måste den oskyldige ofta förlita sig på sitt eget 
minne, då andra hjälpmedel (t.ex. en notering i en kalender, 
tidsstämplade kvitton eller dylikt) sällan finns till hands. Det 
mänskliga minnet är dock inte felfritt och det förekommer därför 
brottsutredningar i vilka oskyldiga gett både felaktiga och ofull-
ständiga alibin – något som i vissa fall fått förödande konsekvenser 
då personer felaktigt dömts för ett brott de inte begått. Trots vikten 
av ett korrekt alibi finns det idag endast en handfull studier på detta 
tema och ingen av dessa studier har genomförts i syfte att un-
dersöka möjligheten att bistå oskyldiga att generera korrekta alibin. 
Syftet med denna avhandling, som består av tre experimentella 
studier och en survey, var därför att undersöka om minnes-
främjande instruktioner kan hjälpa oskyldigt misstänka att lämna 
korrekta och fullständiga alibin om sina förehavanden under den 
kritiska tidsperioden (Studie I & II). Vidare syftade avhandlingen 
till att undersöka om förhörsledarens förbestämda uppfattning om 
den misstänktes skuld påverkar den som är oskyldig att ge ett 
korrekt och fullständigt alibi (Studie III) samt studera allmänhetens 
uppfattning kring oskyldiga misstänkta och deras möjligheter att 
generera korrekta och fullständiga alibin (Studie IV). I Studie I 
blev skyldiga och oskyldiga misstänkta (N = 192) ombedda att ge 
ett alibi under ett förhör gällande den kritiska tidsperioden för ett 
iscensatt brott (stöld av ett USB-minne). Innan förhöret blev 
deltagarna antingen instruerade att ge ett i) så korrekt alibi som 
möjligt, ii) så fullständigt alibi som möjligt, eller iii) så korrekt och 
fullständigt alibi som möjligt. Kontrollgruppens deltagare fick inga 
minnesfrämjande instruktioner innan förhöret. Resultaten visade att 
endast de oskyldigt misstänkta var behjälpta av instruktionerna. Av 
dessa rapporterade de som instruerats att ge ett så korrekt och full-
ständigt alibi som möjligt fler korrekta detaljer i jämförelse med 
kontrollgruppen. Bland de skyldiga som fick samma instruktioner 
skedde ingen ökning av antalet korrekta detaljer. I Studie II stu-
derades oskyldigt misstänkta och deras förmåga att generera 
korrekta och fullständiga alibin vidare i ett liknande experimentellt 
upplägg. Oskyldigt misstänkta (N = 78) fick inför det iscensatta 
förhöret instruktioner om att rapportera korrekt och fullständigt om 
i) sitt tidigare agerande när de genomförde oskyldiga uppgifter, 
eller ii) om sitt tidigare agerande och bevis som kunde ge stöd åt 
deras redogörelse. Kontrollgruppen fick inga minnesfrämjande in-
struktioner. Resultaten visade att de två olika instruktionerna var 
lika effektiva. Oavsett vilken instruktion deltagarna fick (berätta 
om sitt tidigare agerande vs. berätta om sitt agerande och 
stödbevisning), gav de fler korrekta detaljer i jämförelse med 
kontrollgruppen. I Studie III (N = 90) lämnade oskyldigt mis-
stänkta sina alibin till en förhörsledare som kommunicerade till 
dem att hon hade en uppfattning om att de var i) oskyldiga, ii) 
skyldiga, eller iii) att hon inte hade någon uppfattning alls om deras 
inblandning i brottet. Resultatet visade att antalet korrekta detaljer 
inte påverkades av förhörsledarens skulduppfattning, trots att 
deltagarna angav att de var medvetna om den. Slutligen, Studie IV 
syftade till att studera allmänhetens uppfattning och kunskap om 
hur alibin genereras. Respondenterna som var från allmänheten i 
Storbritannien, Israel och Sverige (N = 343) tenderade att tro att 
misstänkta som är oskyldiga till ett brott kan ge korrekta alibin, och 
att om de av någon anledning skulle ge ett inkorrekt alibi så är min-
nesfel den primära orsaken till detta. Därtill tenderade de tro att 
förhörsledarens uppfattning om den misstänktes skuld kan komma 
att påverka förhöret med den misstänkte något som kan ställa till 
problem. Deltagarna ansåg nämligen att förhörsledare i allmänhet 
tenderar att ha en förbestämd uppfattning om en misstänkt gärning-
spersons skuld redan innan den misstänkte förhörs, alternativt att 
denna uppfattning formas under tiden den misstänkte förhörs. Sam-
mantaget visar avhandlingens studier att oskyldigt misstänkta kan 
vara väl behjälpta av att få instruktioner inför det att de skall ge ett 
alibi (Studie I & II). Att ge enkla instruktioner till en misstänkt att 
hen skall ge så korrekt och så fullständig information som möjligt 
om sina förehavanden under den kritiska tidsperioden kan gynna 
oskyldigt misstänkta att ge alibi, något som i förlängningen kan 
minska risken för att de döms för ett brott de inte har begått. Sam-
tidigt visar resultaten av denna avhandlingen att dessa instruktioner 
inte verkar gynna de som gjort sig skyldiga till ett brott. Framtida 
forskning bör således undersöka minnesfrämjande tekniker närmare 
vid förhör med misstänkta för att på sikt kunna bistå polisen med 
denna kunskap. Studie III visade att förhörsledarens förbestämda 
uppfattning inte påverkade de misstänktas förmåga att lämna 
korrekta och fullständiga alibin, ett resultat som skall tas med viss 
försiktighet då realismen i studiens upplägg var låg. De iscensatta 
förhör som genomfördes i denna studie var till exempel betydligt 
kortare, och pressen på den misstänkte betydligt lägre, i jämförelse 
med verkliga polisförhör. Det är min förhoppning att även detta 
adresseras i framtida forskning. Till sist, Studie IV visade att den 
allmänna uppfattningen är att oskyldiga misstänkta kan anses vara 
skyldiga redan innan de blivit förhörda och att denna skuldupp-
fattning kan påverka förhöret. Med tanke på alla de som bevisligen 
dömts för brott de inte själva begått är denna allmänna uppfattning 
fullt befogad, och återigen pekar den på vikten av att ta fram evi-
densbaserade minnesfrämjande tekniker som kan hjälpa oskyldiga 
att ge alibi vid polisförhör.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In July 1984, 22-year-old Jennifer Thompson-Cannino was sex-
ually assaulted by a man who broke into her apartment. Eleven days 
later, Ms. Thompson-Cannino identified Ronald Cotton in a physical 
line-up as the man who attacked her after having already selected his 
picture from a photo array. Mr. Cotton claimed that he could not 
have attacked Ms. Thompson-Cannino because on the night of the 
assault, he had been with several people including his brother and 
friends and had finished the night at a club. Unfortunately, Mr. Cot-
ton had the dates confused, as his mother reminded him that at the 
time in question he had been at home, sleeping on the couch. Alt-
hough there were people who could verify that Mr. Cotton had been 
at home at the time of the crime, he realised that the police would 
discover the error in his original statement. When he explained this 
mistake to his attorney, the attorney told him that “the inconsistent 
alibi would only give the District Attorney the opportunity to brand 
[him] as a liar” (Thompson-Cannino, Cotton, & Torneo, 2009, p. 
92). Despite believing that the police officers who interviewed him 
had “already decided [he] was guilty” (ibid, p. 84), Mr. Cotton was 
confident in his innocence and refused to sign a plea bargain. In Jan-
uary 1985, he was sentenced to life in prison plus 50 years. However, 
a decade later, evidence from the case was submitted for DNA test-
ing and showed no match to Mr. Cotton but rather a match to a con-
vict who had already confessed to committing the crime to a fellow 
inmate. Eventually, in 1995, after serving over 10 years for a crime 
he did not commit, Mr. Cotton was released from prison and cleared 
of all charges. On the whole ordeal, which started from the day po-
lice first arrived at his home, Mr. Cotton noted: “From that day for-
ward, I would always pay attention to the date and the time, memo-
rizing details of what happened and when. My life might just depend 
on it” (Thompson-Cannino, Cotton, & Torneo, 2009, p. 75). 
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When innocent suspects provide a statement in an attempt to con-
vince police interviewers of their innocence of a crime, namely an 
alibi, they must rely on their memory, particularly when they do not 
have the opportunity to consult others or use memory aids such as 
calendars or diaries. Consequently, the fallibility of human memory 
puts innocent suspects at risk of providing an inaccurate and/or in-
complete alibi, which can be detrimental to their defence. To date, 
most research on the provision of statements by people who might 
have been involved in a crime has focused on eyewitnesses and vic-
tims (e.g., Fisher, 1995; Fisher & Geiselman, 2010; Gabbert, Hope, 
& Fisher, 2009). Research that has concerned suspect statements has 
focused mostly on innocent suspects’ (in)ability to provide corrobo-
rating evidence (e.g., Nieuwkamp, Horselenberg, & van Koppen, 
2017; Olson & Charman 2012; Strange, Dysart, & Loftus, 2014) and 
alibi believability as a function of factors such as corroborating evi-
dence (e.g., Olson & Wells, 2004; Strange et al., 2014) or salacious-
ness (Nieuwkamp, Horselenberg, & van Koppen, 2016). However, 
such previous research has not focused on suspects’ ability to report 
accurately and informatively about their whereabouts during a criti-
cal time. As such, research on alibi provision is scarce, particularly 
with respect to the factor of interview techniques that may enhance 
or diminish an innocent suspect’s memory output while providing an 
alibi. A second factor of interest in alibi generation pertains to the 
presumption of guilt with which interviewers may approach inter-
views with suspects and which may consequently affect the quality 
of suspects’ alibis. Mr. Cotton noted that the police officer who in-
terviewed him had already decided that he was guilty, but it is un-
known whether and how this presumption of guilt affects innocent 
suspects’ memory output when they provide an alibi. 
The aim of the present thesis is to address gaps in the literature 
about alibi generation. To this end, three experimental studies and 
one survey were conducted. Specifically, the present thesis exam-
ined whether memory-based reporting instructions provided to sus-
pects prior to alibi provision increases their memory output for their 
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past actions (Study I), and, additionally, for evidence that could sup-
port their alibi (Study II). The effects of an interviewer displaying 
behaviour consistent with a presumption of guilt on innocent sus-
pects’ memory output during alibi provision were then examined 
(Study III). Finally, the beliefs of members of the general public 
about alibis generated by innocent suspects and the issue of inter-
viewers’ presumption of guilt were investigated (Study IV). With the 
data from these four studies, the present thesis is aimed to contribute 
to the growing body of research on alibi generation. From an applied 
perspective, by developing theoretically informed interview tech-
niques, this thesis is hoped to maximize both innocent suspects’ 
memory output and interviewers’ time and resources through elicit-
ing as much valid information as possible during suspect interviews. 
Before turning to the individual studies, I discuss how innocent 
suspects usually behave during forensic interviews and offer an 
overview of research into alibi generation and suspect interviewing. 
I then describe the factors that may put innocent suspects’ alibis at 
risk and discuss how such risk factors may be challenged to improve 
innocent suspects’ chances to provide complete and accurate alibis. 
 
What Is an Alibi? 
An alibi is a statement that people suspected of a crime provide 
to police interviewers to convince them that they could not have 
committed the crime of which they are being held suspects. This pro-
cess has been identified as the generation domain of alibis (Burke, 
Turtle, & Olson, 2007; Olson & Charman, 2012; Olson & Wells, 
2004). According to Burke et al. (2007), the generation domain com-
prises two phases—the story phase and the validation phase. In the 
story phase, suspects provide the alibi, reporting from memory their 
actions and whereabouts during the time of the crime (Burke et al., 
2007; Dysart & Strange, 2012; Olson, 2013). In the validation phase, 
suspects attempt to corroborate their alibi by offering one of two (or 
both) types of evidence—physical and person. Physical evidence re-
fers to any object that can indicate that the suspect was at a certain 
4 
 
place at a certain time during the time of the crime (e.g., a security-
camera recording or a shopping receipt). Person evidence refers to 
anyone who can support the suspect’s alibi, confirming their pres-
ence at a certain place at a certain time. Such a person may be famil-
iar to the suspect (e.g., parent, friend) or unfamiliar (e.g., a store 
clerk, a passer-by; Burke et al., 2007).  
The story phase and validation phase are followed by the evalua-
tion phase and the ultimate evaluation phase, which comprise the 
believability domain (Burke et al., 2007; Olson & Charman, 2012; 
Olson & Wells, 2004). During the evaluation phase, the credibility 
of the suspect’s alibi is evaluated, usually first by the police. Finally, 
in the ultimate evaluation phase, the credibility of the alibi is deter-
mined in court by different evaluators who are exposed to all the 
facts of the case to determine whether or not the suspect has com-
mitted the crime (Burke et al., 2007). While there is a considerable 
body of literature examining the believability domain of alibis (e.g., 
Culhane & Hosch 2012; Olson & Wells, 2004), hardly any research 
has been conducted on the generation domain of alibis (Olson & 
Charman, 2012).  
Why is it important to study alibi generation? Alibi evaluators 
(e.g., police officers) tend to overestimate the ability of innocent sus-
pects to provide accurate alibis (Burke et al., 2007; Dysart & 
Strange, 2012; Olson & Wells, 2012). During a crime investigation, 
erroneous or incomplete alibis may be perceived as indicative of de-
ception (Burke et al., 2007; Dysart & Strange, 2012; Olson & Char-
man, 2012). Non-believed alibis may then lead to a corrupted evalu-
ation of forensic evidence such as DNA samples (see, e.g., Kassin, 
Bogart, & Kerner, 2012). Moreover, innocent suspects’ inability to 
provide a convincing alibi may result in a false conviction (Crozier, 
Strange, & Loftus, 2017; Wells et al., 1998). Understanding the re-
porting behaviour of innocent suspects during alibi provision, as well 
as the factors that may affect this behaviour and improve it, may 
contribute to the prevention of miscarriages of justice. 
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Innocent Suspects’ Behaviour During Police Interviews 
To discuss the various ways to potentially affect an innocent sus-
pect’s alibi generation, it is important first to understand how inno-
cent suspects usually behave during police interviews. Two main 
types of suspects’ behaviour during interviews can be outlined: non-
verbal and verbal. Nonverbal behaviour relates to overt behaviours 
such as vocal cues (e.g., pause durations, stuttering) and visible be-
haviours (e.g., head or/and hand movements, blinking; Sporer & 
Schwandt, 2007; Vrij, 2008a, 2008b). In contrast, verbal behaviour 
is covert, consisting of speech content in terms of its, for example, 
length, structure, and plausibility (DePaulo et al., 2003; Vrij, 2008a). 
Traditionally, suspects’ behaviours in interviews have been studied 
and discussed in terms of the extent to which they serve as cues to 
deception, namely signs that may help interviewers discern a decep-
tive suspect from a truthful one (DePaulo et al., 2003; Vrij, 2008b; 
Vrij, Granhag, & Porter, 2010). While the differentiation between 
truth-tellers and liars (deception detection) is not within the scope of 
the current thesis, findings about innocent suspects’ behaviour in the 
deception detection literature are relevant to its context.  
In 2003, DePaulo and her colleagues (for a review, see Vrij, 
2008a) published a comprehensive meta-analysis on results from 
120 independent samples, examining 1,338 estimates of 158 cues to 
deception. Their aim was to determine, from examined samples, 
whether cues differentiating liars from truth-tellers do in fact exist. 
Regardless of the importance of this meta-analysis to deception de-
tection research, and despite finding mostly weak support in terms 
of small effect sizes for predicted categories of cues to deception, 
DePaulo et al.’s (2003) work also provides a curated account of the 
behaviour of suspects during interviews. Of most relevance to the 
current thesis are the behaviours, specifically the verbal behaviours, 
of innocent suspects during interviews. The meta-analysis showed 
that truth-tellers provide a larger number of details in their state-
ments than liars, thus making them appear more forthcoming during 
interviews. Truth-tellers’ statements were also found to be relatively 
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more plausible and believable, and their accounts of sequences of 
events more coherent and logically structured. It was also found that 
when truth-tellers provide information, they do so in a relatively 
more engaging manner, in that they tend more to describe experi-
ences of personal relevance. In this vein, the meta-analysis showed 
that truth-tellers are less likely to distance themselves from the con-
tent of the information they provide (e.g., more use of active than 
passive voice). More generally, DePaulo and colleagues’ meta-anal-
ysis suggested that truth-tellers tend to be more cooperative with the 
interviewer and to appear more helpful. They are also more likely to 
spontaneously correct their statement while providing it and more 
willing to admit when they lack memory of some information. In the 
current thesis, when designing the interview techniques to be exam-
ined during interviews with innocent mock suspects, it was essential 
to consider how innocent suspects usually behave when interviewed 
in order to trigger desired behaviours (e.g., provision of detailed 
statements and cooperation). It should be noted that the data used in 
DePaulo et al.’s (2003) meta-analysis was obtained from studies us-
ing mock rather than real-life suspects. However, because the as-
sumptions made in the present thesis also concern mock rather than 
real suspects, turning to the previous literature on deception detec-
tion is appropriate. 
 
Innocent Suspects’ Self-Regulatory Strategies  
The behaviours of suspects during interviews reflect, and are even 
a result of, their self-regulatory strategies (Granhag & Hartwig, 
2008). Essentially, self-regulatory processes are those by which peo-
ple control and direct their actions (Markus & Wurf, 1987; see also 
Fiske & Taylor, 1991). Markus and Wurf (1987) noted that self-reg-
ulatory processes involve three components: goal setting, cognitive 
preparation for action, and a cybernetic cycle of behaviour. First, an 
individual engages in self-regulation to achieve a certain goal. A 
goal may be specific and explicit, such as the decision to finish a 
marathon on a specific date, or more implicit and general, such as a 
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desire to be perceived as a nice person (Fiske & Taylor, 1991). Next, 
during the step (which may or may not occur) of cognitive prepara-
tion for action, the individual plans and selects a strategy or several 
strategies for achieving the goal. The cognitive aspect plays a role 
here in that the planning is based on prior knowledge of which strat-
egies are useful to achieve which certain goals. Finally, during the 
cybernetic cycle, people attempt to execute their plans and strategies 
while monitoring and assessing the quality of their behaviour. 
The need for self-regulatory strategies is likely to arise when a 
threatening situation approaches, during which the person’s goal 
would be to restore control (Fiske & Taylor, 1991). Fiske and Taylor 
(1991) presented methods that people may use to regain such a sense 
of control. For example, the method of decision control pertains to 
making decisions about the course of action during an upcoming 
stressful situation. An upcoming interview may be perceived by in-
nocent suspects as a threating situation in light of the risk of being 
incorrectly judged as guilty, and it may lead them to engage in self-
regulatory behaviours (Granhag & Hartwig, 2008). In this case, the 
method of decision control (Fiske & Taylor, 1991) may be used to 
reduce the threat of the upcoming interview by planning the types of 
behaviour and information to present (Granhag & Hartwig, 2008). 
Self-regulatory strategies may also be used to control the impression 
the interviewer forms of the suspect. In accord with this self-presen-
tational perspective (DePaulo, 1992; DePaulo et al., 2003), innocent 
suspects – much like guilty ones – are concerned with creating the 
impression that they are honest and credible (Hartwig, Granhag, 
Strömwall, & Doering, 2010). 
Research has shown that innocent suspects use several self-regu-
latory strategies during interviews (Hartwig, Granhag, & Strömwall, 
2007; Hartwig et al., 2010; Strömwall, Hartwig, & Granhag, 2006). 
In a typical study, participants act as either innocent or guilty sus-
pects who, after being accused of committing a crime, provide an 
alibi to convince an interviewer of their innocence. After providing 
their alibi, participants often complete a post-alibi questionnaire in 
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which they describe what (if any) strategies they used during the in-
terview to succeed in the task of convincing the interviewer of their 
innocence. The categorization and analysis of these strategies has 
shown that innocent mock suspects are less likely to plan the verbal 
content of their alibi than guilty mock suspects (Hartwig, et al., 2007; 
Hartwig et al., 2010; Strömwall et al., 2006). It has also been found 
that when innocent mock suspects did plan the verbal content of their 
alibi, the strategies they used were more forthcoming than those of 
guilty mock suspects. Specifically, innocent mock suspects were oc-
cupied with “telling the truth like it happened”, cooperating, and 
providing a detailed statement (Hartwig, et al., 2007; Hartwig et al., 
2010; Strömwall et al., 2006). 
Suspects’ self-regulatory strategies reflect their mental state and 
reasoning (Granhag & Hartwig, 2008). The reasoning underlying the 
self-regulatory strategies of innocent suspects is their belief that their 
innocence bears the power to exonerate them (Kassin & Norwick, 
2004; Vrij et al., 2010). This trust of innocent suspects in their own 
innocence may be due to a more general belief in a just world (Ler-
ner, 1980) in which, eventually, people get what they deserve (Kas-
sin & Norwick, 2004; see also Kassin & Gudjonsson, 2004). They 
may also be under the “illusion of transparency”, meaning that they 
overestimate others’ ability to read their internal states, such as their 
feelings and thoughts (Gilovich, Savitsky, & Medvec, 1998). Due to 
such reasoning, innocent suspects are typically forthcoming and in-
formative during interviews and from the beginning waive their right 
to remain silent (Kassin & Norwick, 2004). In fact, these types of 
reasoning were also found to embody innocent mock suspects’ ex-
planations for not having a strategy before providing an alibi (Hart-
wig et al., 2007): innocent mock suspects noted the fact that they 
were innocent as a rationale for not needing to plan how to make 
their statement appear credible to the interviewer. For the memory-
based instructions developed in the present thesis, it was important 
also to consider innocent suspects’ self-regulatory strategies, given 
that such strategies influence their behaviours during interviews. 
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Challenges for Innocent Suspects During Alibi Provision 
Despite their willingness to be informative, research has demon-
strated that providing accurate and complete alibis can be challeng-
ing for innocent suspects. Two main factors may hamper innocent 
suspects’ ability to provide accurate and complete alibis. One is im-
paired memory processes; the second is the interviewer’s presump-
tion of guilt, the effect of which on innocent suspects’ alibis is less 
known than that of impaired memory processes. 
 
Impaired memory processes. When providing truthful infor-
mation, suspects rely on their autobiographical memory (often re-
ferred to as episodic memory), namely details of past events, specif-
ically with respect to locations of events, people involved, thoughts 
and feelings experienced, and sequence of actions (Burke et al., 
2007; Devitt, Monk-Fromont, Schacter & Addis, 2016; Olson & 
Wells, 2012). However, due to limitations in human memory, the 
information innocent suspects provide is prone to errors, inconsist-
encies, and suggestibility (Schacter, 1999; Tourangeau, 2000). 
These limitations may involve all stages of information processing: 
encoding, storage, and retrieval and reporting. In the encoding phase, 
it is likely that event details are encoded only superficially if the per-
son is engaging in a routine task, as opposed to an out-of-the-ordi-
nary activity or one of significance (Burke et al., 2007; Crozier et al., 
2017; Tourangeau, 2000). Event details that have been encoded and 
stored in memory may nevertheless become less accessible with the 
passage of time (Pertzov, Manohar, & Husain, 2017; Tourangeau, 
2000), and are likely to be forgotten if not retrieved often (Schacter, 
1999). Innocent suspects may be unmotivated to retrieve any critical 
details until they are interviewed by the police. Consequently, and 
because they may not be asked for their alibi until days, months, or 
even years after the time of the alleged crime (Olson & Charman, 
2012), they may forget relevant information by the time they are in-
terviewed.  
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If not forgotten, retrieved memory details may be distorted if the 
rememberer is exposed to misinformation from others, which is then 
integrated with the original memory (Loftus, Miller, & Burns, 1978; 
see Frenda, Nichols & Loftus, 2011, for a review). In other cases, by 
trying to create an account of their actions and whereabouts during 
the critical time, innocent suspects may wrongly combine infor-
mation from different memory traces into one erroneous report about 
an event that did not occur, in what is known as a “memory-conjunc-
tion error” (Reinitz, Lammers, & Cochran, 1992; see also Devitt et 
al., 2016). Alternatively, in their attempt to provide a coherent alibi 
by accounting for missing information, innocent suspects may rely 
on existing knowledge and beliefs in the form of scripts and sche-
mas, especially those that pertain to what they usually do at a certain 
time (Crozier et al., 2017; Leins & Charman, 2016). However, rely-
ing on a schema that does not match the real event may result in a 
mistaken report (Leins & Charman, 2016).  
Existing research on alibi generation has shown that innocent sus-
pects do indeed struggle to provide accurate and complete alibis due 
to impaired memory processes. Olson and Charman (2012) asked 
participants to provide four initial alibis: two for specific dates six to 
14 weeks prior to the study session (i.e., distant-past alibis) and two 
for a date three days prior to the session (i.e., near-past alibis). Par-
ticipants were instructed to rely solely on their memory of what they 
had been doing during those times. Participants were then given 48 
hours to locate the corroborating physical and person evidence they 
had initially mentioned to support their initial alibis. Olson and Char-
man (2012) found that participants generated fewer initial alibis 
about distant-past events than about near-past events. Moreover, 371 
(36%) of the 1020 initial alibis provided turned out to be mistaken, 
with 117 of those mistaken alibis requiring a narrative change (with 
more distant-past than near-past alibis requiring this change).  
Another demonstration of innocent suspects’ difficulty in report-
ing accurately from memory comes from research by Strange et al. 
(2014). Participants provided an alibi for a time frame three weeks 
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prior to the study session and were then given a week to find evi-
dence to corroborate their alibi. When providing their alibi for the 
same time frame again after a week, during which they had 
searched for evidence to support their actual whereabouts, it was 
found that the two alibis were consistent (i.e., participants were ini-
tially correct) on only 53% of the details. According to Strange et 
al. (2014), this finding suggested that the initial alibis contained a 
significant amount of inaccurate information. Culhane, Hosch, and 
Kehn (2008) found that even when participants were asked to re-
port what they were doing during a specific time frame only two 
days prior to the study, 61 (10.9%) of 543 participants stated that 
they had no memory of their actions during that specific time (or 
had no witness that could corroborate their alibi). In sum, the dete-
rioration and distortion of innocent suspects’ memory for past 
events create a fertile ground for them to provide inaccurate, in-
complete, and ultimately unconvincing alibis. 
 
Interviewers’ presumption of guilt. By its nature, an interview 
is a social interaction between the interviewer/s and the interviewee 
(i.e., the suspect). At times, although a suspect is innocent of the 
crime, the interviewer may approach the interview already believing 
the suspect to be guilty (Kassin, Goldstein, & Savitsky, 2003). Alt-
hough a presumption of guilt may be erroneous, it may still be held 
confidently. For example, when Moston, Stephenson, and William-
son (1992) investigated 1,067 cases of suspects interviewed by 
United Kingdom (UK) police detectives, they found that in 73% 
(780) of cases the interviewers were sure of the suspect’s guilt before 
the interview took place. Factors that may initiate a presumption of 
guilt include insufficient or even lack of evidence, pressure on the 
interviewer (from the public or their own police force) to find the 
culprit, or a need for appreciation (Mortimer & Shepherd, 1999). 
Yet, this presumption of guilt may also be based on nothing more 
than a hunch that the interviewer forms during early interactions with 
the suspect (Kassin, 2006).  
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While an interviewer’s presumption of guilt may be formed only 
by internal factors (e.g., the need for appreciation or a hunch), some 
interview techniques encourage interviewers to form this belief and 
even to maintain it. One such technique is the Reid technique that 
may be used during American police interviews (Inbau, Reid, Buck-
ley, & Jayne, 2001). In this technique, the interviewer first evaluates 
whether the suspect is lying or telling the truth. Then, if considered 
by the interviewer to be lying, the suspect is interviewed using some 
or all of the nine steps of the technique (Inbau et al., 2001). While 
guiding interviewers to initially approach interviews with an as-
sumption of innocence or a neutral attitude, the Reid guide also sug-
gests that interviewers adopt a guilt-presumptive approach to sus-
pects. Moreover, the guide explicitly explains to interviewers that 
they should approach the nine-step interview with a suspect “whose 
guilt, in the opinion of the investigator, seems definite or reasonably 
certain” (Inbau et al., 2001, p. 68). It is not surprising then that the 
Reid technique has been described as a guilt-presumptive technique 
dedicated to eliciting confessions from suspects (Gudjonsson & 
Pearse, 2011; Kassin, 2005). 
In contrast to the confrontational Reid technique that may be used 
in the American police system, the UK police system uses a more 
information-gathering approach, namely the PEACE interview 
model (Central Planning and Training Unit, 1992a, 1992b). The de-
mand for this first national training programme for interviewing wit-
nesses and suspects grew following several miscarriages of justice 
due partly to biased and unethical interview techniques. Five stages 
comprise the PEACE model: Planning and preparation; Engage and 
explain; Account; Closure; and, Evaluation. The principles underly-
ing the PEACE model are open mindedness and fairness, and the 
model is more interviewee-led, allowing suspects the opportunity to 
present their version of events. Importantly, the PEACE model aims 
to eliminate false confessions, and interviewers are encouraged to 
avoid assumptions of guilt (e.g., Griffiths & Milne, 2006; Shawyer, 
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Milne, & Bull, 2009). The PEACE model has been adopted by sev-
eral other police organizations, such as those in Norway (i.e., the 
KREATIV model; Fahsing & Rachlew, 2009) and New Zealand 
(Bull & Soukara, 2010). Despite the PEACE recommendation to 
keep an open mind and avoid presumptions of guilt, interviewers 
nevertheless continue to approach interviews with suspects with bi-
ased beliefs about their guilt (Shawyer & Milne, 2015).  
Can merely believing that suspects are guilty prior to interviewing 
them affect the interview process? In their effort to answer this ques-
tion, Kassin and colleagues (2003) led their interviewer-participants 
to expect that the suspect-participants they were about to interview 
were either guilty or innocent of a mock theft. As a preparation for 
the interview, the mock interviewers were asked to choose six ques-
tions they would ask from a list of guilt-presumptive and neutral 
questions. Mock interviewers primed with guilt expectations chose 
more guilt-presumptive questions than those primed with innocence 
expectations. Following the interview, 42% of the guilt-presumptive 
interviewers judged the suspects guilty versus only 19% of the inno-
cence-presumptive interviewers, irrespective of the suspect’s actual 
veracity. Neutral participants then listened to parts of the taped in-
terviews while being “blind” to the interviewers’ presumptions and 
the suspects’ veracity. These listeners tended to judge more suspects 
interviewed by guilt-presumptive interviewers as guilty than those 
interviewed by innocence-presumptive interviewers. Moreover, the 
former suspects were perceived by these listeners to be more defen-
sive than the latter suspects.  
Hill, Memon, and McGeorge (2008) extended Kassin et al.’s 
(2003) study by showing that mock suspects (who chose whether or 
not to cheat on a test) interviewed with guilt-presumptive questions 
reported feeling more pressure during the interview to confess than 
did mock suspects interviewed with neutral questions. Hill et al. 
(2008) additionally found that neutral participants who listened to 
recordings of the interviewed suspects rated innocent suspects who 
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were asked guilt-presumptive questions as more guilty than guilty 
suspects who replied to such questions. 
The studies of Kassin et al. (2003) and Hill et al. (2008) demon-
strate how merely believing that suspects are guilty prior to inter-
viewing them affects the entire interview process, eventually affect-
ing how neutral observers judge the interviewed suspects. What are 
the psychological processes underpinning the effects of a presump-
tion of guilt? In the context of suspect interviews, when an inter-
viewer approaches an interview already believing that the suspect is 
guilty, a confirmation bias is especially likely to be evident (Findley 
& Scott, 2006). Confirmation biases pertain to the unintentionally 
selective gathering and use of information to increase the validity of 
the belief held by perceivers (Nickerson, 1998) such as interviewers. 
Accordingly, interviewer-participants in Kassin et al. (2003) and Hill 
et al. (2008) who were led to believe that their interviewees were 
guilty chose/formulated (respectively) questions that were coloured 
by this belief. A key feature of a confirmation bias is that it is likely 
to develop without the perceiver’s awareness or intention (Nicker-
son, 1998).  
After the perceiver forms a belief about the target and behaves 
towards the target in accordance with this belief, this may change the 
target’s behaviour such that it confirms the perceiver’s belief, seem-
ingly providing evidence for the perceiver’s belief (i.e., self-fulfilling 
prophecy interaction sequence; Merton, 1948; see also Darley & 
Fazio, 1980; Mortimer & Shepherd, 1999; Nickerson, 1998). In the 
studies by Kassin et al. (2003) and Hill et al. (2008), participant-
suspects who were asked guilt-presumptive questions (vs. inno-
cence-presumptive or neutral questions) were judged by neutral par-
ticipants as more guilty, defensive, and nervous. With respect to the 
interviewer, s/he may fail to recognize that her/his guilt presumption 
has initiated this chain of events; s/he may therefore mistakenly con-
clude that the suspect’s behaviour is a sign of their actual guilt (see 
Darley & Fazio, 1980). While the perceiver’s belief is required to 
affect her/his behaviour towards the target, the target’s perception of 
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the perceiver’s behaviour is essential to determine the target’s be-
haviour in response to the perceiver’s behaviour. The target may, for 
example, attribute the (biased) behaviour of the perceiver to disposi-
tional characteristics of the perceiver. Alternatively, the target may 
attribute the perceiver’s behaviour to the target’s own characteristics 
(Darley & Fazio, 1980).  
To conclude, being motivated to convince police interviewers of 
their innocence may not be enough for innocent suspects to succeed 
in this goal, as factors out of their control may affect their ability to 
provide a convincing alibi. While memory-related factors have been 
found to hamper innocent suspects’ ability to provide accurate alibis, 
the effects of interviewers’ presumption of guilt on innocent sus-
pects’ memory output have been examined for the first time in the 
current thesis.  
 
Improving the Process of Alibi Provision by Innocent Suspects 
Existing findings on factors that affect innocent suspects’ ability 
to provide a convincing alibi call for further research on other such 
factors, as well as on means to counter their effects. Such factors 
may enhance innocent suspects’ verbal output and help them provide 
convincing alibis.  
 
Dealing with impaired memory processes. Studies to date de-
voted to developing memory-based interview techniques that may 
help innocent suspects provide complete and accurate alibis are 
scarce (see Burke et al., 2007; Crozier et al., 2017; Leins & Charman, 
2016). A notable exception is Leins and Charman’s (2016) study, in 
which they demonstrated the effects of recall cue on alibi accuracy. 
In the first stage of the study participants completed a number of 
tasks. Between five and nine days later, participants provided an alibi 
for crimes allegedly committed in the previous stage of the study1. 
                                                                
1 All participants were innocent of the crimes, but some participants were 
instructed to respond deceptively to the interviewer’s questions. When reporting 
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The alibi was provided across three conditions of recall cue, inform-
ing participants prior to alibi provision about the time at which the 
alleged crimes happened (time-only cue), the location of the alleged 
crimes (location-only cue), or both the timing and location of the 
crimes (time-and-location cue). It was found that participants cued 
by a location-only prompt provided more accurate alibis than partic-
ipants cued by time-only and time-and-location prompts. The re-
searchers suggested that in the paired cue condition, the less effec-
tive time cue became dominant, resulting in similar findings to those 
obtained with the time cue alone. Alternatively, they suggested that 
the paired cue promoted a narrower memory search than did the lo-
cation-only cue, consequently decreasing the efficiency of the paired 
cue in finding accurate matches in memory. Despite difficulties in-
terpreting the findings, Leins and Charman’s (2016) findings 
demonstrate that memory-based interview prompts may affect and 
even enhance alibi accuracy.  
A well-known interview technique that has been found to elicit 
more complete and accurate information from interviewees is the 
cognitive interview (CI; Fisher & Geiselman, 2010; Fisher, Geisel-
man, & Amador, 1989). The CI is a set of memory-based instructions 
that interviewers provide to witnesses and victims prior to and during 
an interview (Fisher & Geiselman, 2010; Fisher et al., 1989; 
Köehnken, Milne, Memon & Bull, 1999). Most relevant to the cur-
rent thesis is the instruction in the CI to interviewees to report eve-
rything they can think about while refraining from guessing. Thus, 
the standard instructions of the CI encourage interviewees to max-
imize both completeness and accuracy. Because the CI was devel-
oped for use in witness and victim interviews, however, it remains 
unknown whether it can readily be used to enhance innocent sus-
pects’ memory output. Moreover, previous research has not ad-
dressed the question of whether different instructions, with different 
                                                                
on the accuracy findings, however, Leins and Charman (2016) did not address 
the different veracity conditions.  
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emphases on the informativeness and accuracy of information, pro-
duce different completeness and accuracy of memory output. In the 
current thesis, I drew on memory theory to develop pre-alibi instruc-
tions for use with suspects to examine their effects on the informa-
tiveness and accuracy of innocent mock suspects’ memory output. 
 
Enhancing innocent suspects’ memory output during alibi pro-
vision. In the present thesis, I sought to enhance the completeness 
and accuracy of innocent mock suspects’ memory output in their al-
ibis in terms of two measures presented in Koriat and Goldsmith’s 
(1996) model of strategic regulation of memory accuracy. Specifi-
cally, the model distinguished between quantity measures which 
pertain to the number of (only) correct details that can be remem-
bered, and accuracy measures which are used to assess the probabil-
ity of each reported detail’s correctness (i.e., the number of correct 
details provided [quantity] out of the total number of details pro-
vided—correct and incorrect). According to Koriat and Goldsmith’s 
(1996; see also Koriat & Goldsmith, 1994) model, people can en-
hance the accuracy of the information they report from memory if 
allowed to freely decide what and how much information to report 
or withhold. Presenting innocent suspects with pre-alibi instructions 
that differ in their emphasis on the informativeness and accuracy of 
information requested may reveal whether a certain type of such re-
porting instructions can increase innocent suspects’ memory output 
in terms of the quantity and accuracy rates of their alibis. In the cur-
rent thesis, I developed such pre-alibi instructions and examined 
their effects on innocent mock suspects’ memory output during alibi 
provision. 
 
Dealing with interviewers’ presumption of guilt. In light of 
previous findings (Kassin et al., 2003; Hill et al., 2008) on the effects 
of interviewers’ presumption of guilt on innocent suspects’ non-ver-
bal behaviour, it is possible that this presumption also affects the 
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quantity and accuracy of their alibis. If this is the case, further re-
search should be devoted to reducing guilt presumptions at the outset 
of suspect interviews. However, to develop effective means to re-
duce such presumptions, it is first necessary to examine whether they 
affect innocent suspects’ verbal behaviour while providing an alibi. 
In the current thesis, I examined the effect of an interviewer’s dis-
played behaviour consistent with a presumption of guilt on innocent 
mock suspects’ alibis in terms of the completeness and accuracy of 
the information provided. 
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SUMMARY OF EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
 
General and Specific Aims 
The studies comprising the current thesis sought to address the 
gap in the literature concerning alibi provision by innocent suspects, 
mainly by developing and examining interview techniques that may 
increase innocent suspects’ memory output during alibi provision. 
The effects of the presumption of guilt with which interviewers may 
approach suspect interviews on innocent suspects’ alibis were also 
examined. 
In Study I, considering innocent suspects’ difficulty in providing 
complete and accurate information from memory (Olson & Char-
man, 2012; Strange, Dysart, & Loftus, 2014), I examined whether 
memory-based reporting instructions presented to innocent mock 
suspects prior to the occasion of providing an alibi increased their 
memory output when reporting their past actions. Study II expanded 
upon Study I by examining whether pre-alibi instruction increased 
innocent mock suspects’ memory output not only for their alibi (i.e., 
past actions and whereabouts), but also for evidence that might cor-
roborate their alibi.  
In Study III, I examined whether an interviewer’s presumption 
of guilt communicated to innocent mock suspects affected their 
memory output in terms of the completeness and accuracy of their 
alibis. The aim of Study III was to expand the existing literature 
(Kassin, Goldstein, & Savitsky, 2003; Hill, Memon, & McGeorge, 
2008), which has demonstrated the effects of interviewers’ presump-
tion of suspects’ guilt on suspects’ non-verbal behaviour, such as in-
creased defensiveness and nervousness. Specifically, the study ex-
amined the effect of this presumption of guilt on the verbal behav-
iour of innocent suspects during their provision of an alibi.  
Across Study I, II, and III, participants’ memory output was ex-
amined in terms of the number of correct details provided (quantity 
measure) and the number of correct details out of the total (correct 
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and incorrect) number of details provided (accuracy measure; Koriat 
& Goldsmith, 1996).  
Finally, in Study IV, a survey comprising eight questions was 
disseminated among lay people in the UK, Israel, and Sweden to ex-
amine their beliefs about the verbal behaviour of innocent suspects 
during alibi provision and the issue of interviewer’s presumption of 
guilt. In the UK, these participants were members of the public who 
might serve jury duty and thus be asked to judge the believability of 
alibis of innocent suspects in court.  
Table 1 presents an overview of the studies included in the current 
thesis. 
 
Study I 
Study I explored whether the memory output of innocent mock 
suspects could be increased by presenting them with specific report-
ing instructions before they provided an alibi. Specifically, partici-
pants provided an alibi across three conditions of pre-alibi instruc-
tions emphasizing the informativeness of the alibi, its accuracy, or 
both its informativeness and accuracy. Control participants received 
no special instructions. I also included a sample of lying participants 
in the role of guilty mock suspects to better establish that any effects 
of the pre-alibi instructions on innocent mock suspects’ alibis would 
be due to effects on memory (cf. reliance on pre-planned verbal strat-
egies; Hartwig, Granhag, Strömwall, & Doering, 2010; Strömwall, 
Hartwig, & Granhag, 2006). 
Based on previous research on the behaviour of innocent and 
guilty suspects during interviews (e.g., DePaulo et al., 2003; Hart-
wig, Granhag, & Strömwall, 2007; Olson & Charman, 2012), I pre-
dicted an interaction effect between participant-guilt conditions and 
the pre-alibi instructions on both quantity of correct details and ac-
curacy rates of participants’ alibis. Specifically, I predicted that the 
performance of the innocent mock suspects would be affected by the 
different pre-alibi instructions in terms of the quantity (of correct de-
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tails) and accuracy rates of the details provided. In contrast, I pre-
dicted that the reporting behaviour of the guilty mock suspects would 
not express any effects of the pre-alibi instructions.  
Considering that this was the first study to test the effects of re-
porting instructions on the memory reporting behaviour of innocent 
suspects, no predictions were made about the exact location and di-
rection of differences between specific pre-alibi instructions for in-
nocent mock suspects. These effects were instead tested in an ex-
ploratory manner.  
 
Table 1 
Overview of Studies Included in The Current Thesis 
Study Method N K Independent 
 Variables 
Outcome 
Variables 
I Laboratory 
experiment 
192 8 Pre-Alibi Instructions 
[accuracy,  
informativeness,  
accuracy  
and informativeness, 
control]  
×  
Participant Guilt [inno-
cent,  
guilty] 
Quantity and  
accuracy rates of  
alibis 
II Laboratory 
experiment 
78 3 Pre-Alibi Instructions 
[task, enhanced,  
control] 
Quantity and  
accuracy rates of  
alibis 
III Laboratory 
experiment 
90 3 Interviewer’s belief 
[guilt, innocence,  
neutral] 
Quantity and  
accuracy rates of  
alibis 
IV Online  
Survey 
343 - - Participants’ beliefs  
regarding suspects’  
alibis and their 
explanations  
for their beliefs 
Note. N = total number of participants, k = number of conditions.  
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Method 
One-hundred and ninety-two native English-speaking partici-
pants (43 males, 149 females) were randomly allocated to one of 
eight experimental conditions in a 2 (participant guilt: innocent vs. 
guilty) × 4 (pre-alibi instructions: accuracy vs. informativeness vs. 
accuracy and informativeness vs. control) between-subjects design 
(n = 24 per condition). The dependent variables were the quantity 
measure and accuracy rates of the alibis. 
The study had 80% power to detect a small effect of f = 0.24 (η2 
= .05) at the .05 significance level.  
Task completion and accusation. Participants completed the 
study individually. In the task room, innocent mock suspects com-
pleted six non-criminal tasks, whereas guilty mock suspects com-
pleted three non-criminal tasks and then committed a mock crime 
(i.e., stealing a memory stick). All participants were surreptitiously 
filmed during task completion to provide ground truth for the cal-
culation of quantity and accuracy measures. En route to another 
room following task completion, the participants were informed 
that a memory stick was missing from the task room and as the in-
dividuals who had been in the room most recently, they were sus-
pected of stealing it. Participants were told that they would soon be 
asked to provide an alibi to convince an interviewer that they had 
not stolen the memory stick.  
Alibi provision under the pre-alibi instructions. In the inter-
view room, all participants were told that they should report in their 
alibi all the details that they could remember about each task. Inno-
cent mock suspects were asked to be truthful in their alibi, whereas 
guilty mock suspects were told that they must lie about stealing the 
memory stick. Guilty mock suspects were told that, to create their 
cover story, during an upcoming 10-minute preparation time pro-
vided to all participants, they would be provided with the full in-
structions for the three additional tasks completed by the innocent 
mock suspects. The experimenter then delivered the pre-alibi in-
structions. After providing their alibi using a computer, participants 
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completed a post-alibi questionnaire, in which they were asked 
about their experience during alibi provision. Finally, participants 
were debriefed and compensated for their participation.  
Calculation of quantity and accuracy rates. For each partici-
pant, a quantity measure and an accuracy rate were calculated for 
the entire alibi: the quantity measure was calculated by totalling the 
number of correct details provided across all tasks per each partici-
pant, and an accuracy rate was calculated by dividing the total 
number of correct details provided across all six tasks in an alibi by 
the total number of details provided overall (correct and incorrect) 
in that alibi.  
Results and Discussion 
The pre-alibi instructions × participant guilt interaction was 
not significant for either the quantity measure or the accuracy rates, 
failing to support my prediction. However, as one of the aims of the 
study was to explore the effects of the pre-alibi instructions on in-
nocent mock suspects, I conducted further analyses whereby I ex-
amined differences in the quantity and accuracy of alibis between 
the pre-alibi instruction conditions separately among innocent and 
guilty mock suspects. 
These analyses revealed an effect of the pre-alibi instruc-
tions on the number of correct details provided (i.e., quantity) by 
innocent suspects only, without compromising accuracy rates. Spe-
cifically, innocent mock suspects in the combined accuracy and in-
formativeness pre-alibi instructions condition provided a larger 
number of correct details than did innocent mock suspects in the 
control condition, without compromising accuracy rates. No other 
differences in the quantity or accuracy of information were found 
between the pre-alibi instructions conditions. The finding that the 
pre-alibi instructions affected the memory output of innocent mock 
suspects but not that of guilty mock suspects was true also when 
analysing only those parts of the alibi in which guilty mock sus-
pects could rely solely on their memory (i.e., reports about the first 
three tasks completed). Overall, the findings of Study I suggest that 
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innocent suspects’ memory output during alibi provision may be 
increased using memory-based reporting instructions. 
 
Study II 
Study II expanded upon Study I by examining the effect of ad-
ministering memory-based retrieval instructions that cued accurate 
and informative reporting about innocent mock suspects’ wherea-
bouts and activities during the critical time period of their alibi as 
well as tangible evidence that could support that alibi. Specifically, 
in the task instructions condition, participants were asked to report 
accurately and informatively about what they had done during the 
critical time period for their alibi (i.e., as in the accuracy and in-
formativeness pre-alibi instructions condition in Study I). In the en-
hanced instructions condition, participants were asked to report ac-
curately and informatively about what they had done during the crit-
ical time period for their alibi (as in the task instructions condition) 
and the evidence that could corroborate their alibi. Participants in the 
control instructions condition were only asked to report about their 
time away from the lab, without receiving further instructions re-
garding the type of information they should report nor how accurate 
and informative their alibi should be.  
It was predicted that the number of correct details provided for 
the entire alibis would be greater in both the enhanced and task in-
structions conditions than in the control condition (Hypothesis 1). 
Additionally, it was predicted that, compared with the task instruc-
tions condition, the enhanced instructions would yield a larger num-
ber of correct details for the entire alibis (Hypothesis 2a) and for the 
evidence details (Hypothesis 2b).  
With respect to accuracy rates, I predicted that these would be 
higher in both the enhanced and task instructions conditions than in 
the control condition for the entire alibis (Hypothesis 3a) and the ev-
idence details (Hypothesis 3b). 
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Method 
Seventy-eight native English-speaking participants (26 males, 52 
females) were randomly allocated to one of three experimental con-
ditions in a between-subjects design comprising three pre-alibi in-
structions conditions: enhanced instructions, task instructions, and 
control instructions (n = 26 per condition). The dependent variables 
were the quantity of correct details reported and accuracy rates.  
The study had 80% power to detect a medium-to-large effect of f 
= 0.36 (η2 = .11) at the .05 significance level. 
The procedure was similar to that in Study I with the following 
main exceptions: (i) participants were only innocent mock suspects; 
(ii) following the completion of each main task, participants gener-
ated evidence that corroborated their whereabouts (i.e., evidence 
tasks); (iii) participants completed the tasks in different locations in 
the building in which the laboratory was located (cf. completion of 
all tasks in one room in Study I); (iv) participants wore a body-cam-
era on their chest to obtain ground truth (cf. were surreptitiously 
filmed inside the task room in Study I); and, (v) participants were 
accused of a theft that occurred in one of the rooms of the building 
while they were away (cf. were accused of a theft that occurred in 
the room which they had earlier occupied during task completion in 
Study I). 
Four measures were calculated for each participant: quantity of 
correct details for the entire alibi and quantity of correct evidence 
details, as well as an accuracy rate for the entire alibi and an accu-
racy rate for evidence details.  
Results and Discussion 
Participants in the task instructions condition and in the enhanced 
instructions condition provided more correct details overall than did 
control participants, supporting Hypothesis 1. However, I did not 
find that asking participants to report about past actions and corrob-
orating evidence yielded a larger number of correct details overall 
than asking them to report about past actions only, failing to support 
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Hypothesis 2a. Also in contrast to my prediction, there were no dif-
ferences in the number of correct evidence details provided between 
pre-alibi instructions conditions, failing to support Hypothesis 2b. 
Finally, neither the accuracy rates of the entire alibis nor the evi-
dence details differed as a result of the pre-alibi instructions, failing 
to support Hypotheses 3a and 3b. Nevertheless, Study II replicated 
Study I by demonstrating the increased performance in the task in-
structions condition (i.e., the combined accuracy and informative-
ness pre-alibi instructions condition in Study I) in terms of number 
of correct details provided over simply requesting participants to re-
port what had happened. Study II also supported the effects of the 
enhanced instructions on the increased number of correct details pro-
vided overall compared with the control condition.  
 
Study III 
In Study III, I examined whether the completeness and quality of 
innocent mock suspects’ alibis were affected by an interviewer com-
municating a belief that they were guilty (guilty-belief condition) or 
innocent (innocent-belief condition) of a crime, or that she had no 
belief about their guilt or innocence (neutral-belief condition). 
I identified and tested two possible predictions pertaining to the 
number of correct details provided and accuracy rates of partici-
pants’ alibis. Granhag, Clemens, and Strömwall (2009) have demon-
strated that statements of guilty mock suspects interviewed under 
high levels of suspicion were more detailed than statements of guilty 
mock suspects interviewed under low levels of suspicion, presuma-
bly because the former mock suspects felt that they had to “work 
hard” to convince the interviewer of their innocence. Accordingly, I 
predicted that the alibis of participants in the guilty-belief condition 
(the equivalent to high-level suspicion in Granhag et al., 2009) 
would include the largest number of correct details. The alibis of 
participants in the innocent-belief condition, in contrast, would in-
clude the smallest number of correct details (Hypothesis 1a). Based 
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on the same rationale, I also predicted that the guilty-belief partici-
pants would also work hard to provide accurate information, and 
thus the accuracy rates of their alibis would be the highest, whereas 
the accuracy rates of alibis in the innocent-belief condition would be 
the lowest (Hypothesis 1b).  
Vrij, Mann, Kristen, and Fisher (2007), however, showed that 
when interviewed with accusatory (vs. information-gathering or be-
haviour analysis) interview styles, mock suspects provide the short-
est statements, perhaps because accusatory interviews cause suspects 
to be less forthcoming. Thus, it was also considered possible that 
presumed-guilty participants would provide the smallest number of 
correct details (Hypothesis 2a) with poorer accuracy rates (Hypoth-
esis 2b), while alibis of participants in the innocent-belief condition 
would include the largest number of correct details and be the most 
accurate.  
Method 
Ninety native English-speaking participants (15 males, 75 fe-
males) were randomly allocated to one of three experimental condi-
tions in a between-subjects design with two conditions in which sus-
pect-interviewees were led to believe that the interviewer believed 
they were guilty (guilty-belief condition, n = 30) or innocent (inno-
cent-belief condition, n = 30) of a theft. Interviewees in a third con-
dition were treated in a neutral manner by the interviewer (neutral-
belief condition, n = 30). The dependent variables were the quantity 
of correct details provided and accuracy rates of participants’ alibis.  
The study had 80% power to detect a medium effect of f = 0.33 
(η2 = .10) at the .05 significance level. 
The procedure was similar to that in Study I with the following 
main exceptions: (i) participants were only innocent mock suspects; 
and, (ii) all participants received the same instructions about the re-
quired accuracy and informativeness of their alibi.  
Following task completion in the task room and after receiving 
the general alibi instructions, a new experimenter (i.e., the inter-
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viewer) conveyed to participants her belief about their alleged re-
sponsibility for the supposed theft. Then, after giving participants 10 
minutes to prepare their alibi, the interviewer reiterated her belief to 
participants regarding their responsibility for the alleged theft. Par-
ticipants then provided their alibi, reporting about the tasks they had 
completed in the task room.  
The calculations of quantity and accuracy measures in Study III 
were similar to those in Study I. 
Results and Discussion 
The interviewer-belief manipulation was successful to the extent 
that participants in the guilty-belief and innocent-belief conditions 
perceived that, before they provided their alibi, the interviewer be-
lieved they were guilty and innocent (respectively) of the theft. How-
ever, no significant differences were observed between the inter-
viewer-belief conditions in terms of the quantity (of correct details) 
and accuracy rates of the alibis provided, failing to support all hy-
potheses. These findings suggest that when it comes to their verbal 
behaviour during brief interviews, innocent suspects interviewed by 
a guilt-presumptive interviewer may remain as informative as those 
interviewed by an innocence-presumptive or neutral interviewer. 
 
Study IV 
To examine the extent to which lay people are familiar with fac-
tors that may lead to an innocent suspect providing an inaccurate, 
incomplete, or otherwise unconvincing alibi, I asked lay people from 
the UK to complete a two-part questionnaire. To extend the general-
izability of the findings, I also disseminated the questionnaire among 
lay people from Israel and Sweden2 
                                                                
2 In Israel, verdicts are reached by the judge, who then also makes the sentencing 
decisions (Barak, 1992). In Sweden, a mixed panel of professional judges and 
lay judges decides on both verdicts and sentencing outcomes (Ortwein, 2003). 
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Method 
The participants were 343 members of the general public from 
three countries, chosen in a convenience sampling (UK: n = 96; Is-
rael: n = 124; and, Sweden: n = 123). An online (Qualtrics) question-
naire comprising eight questions was created in English and then 
translated into both Hebrew and Swedish.  
In the first part of the questionnaire, participants described their 
beliefs regarding (i) the differences between alibis of truth-tellers 
and liars; (ii) the relation between the amount of details provided in 
an alibi and the truthfulness of the alibi; and, (iii) the extent to which 
truthful alibis might contain incorrect details. The second part of the 
survey concerned the factor of interviewers’ guilt presumption. Par-
ticipants were asked to indicate their beliefs regarding (i) the point 
in the course of the investigation in which interviewers begin to form 
an opinion about the guilt or innocence of suspects; (ii) the extent to 
which an interviewer’s presumption of guilt affects what the inter-
viewer says and how s/he behaves during an interview; and, (iii) the 
likelihood that suspects respond to the interviewer’s guilt presump-
tion by (a) providing more details in their alibi; (b) providing details 
even if uncertain of their accuracy; and, (c) confessing to committing 
the crime.  
Results and Discussion 
Participants tended to believe that while innocent suspects are 
more informative about specific details, guilty suspects in general 
try more often to be informative. In addition, most participants be-
lieved that the more details provided in the alibi, the less likely it is 
to be truthful. Most participants who reported this belief explained 
that liars may believe that a detailed alibi is perceived as truthful and 
convincing. Participants’ responses also demonstrated that they were 
reluctant to acknowledge that innocent suspects’ alibis may uninten-
tionally include incorrect details. However, participants acknowl-
edged that memory processes may fail innocent suspects when at-
tempting to report accurately from memory.  
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With respect to the factor of interviewers’ presumption of guilt, 
most participants believed that interviewers usually begin to form a 
belief about suspects’ guilt or innocence before or while suspects 
provide their alibi for the first time. They also tended to believe that 
interviewers’ presumption of guilt may lead them to conduct harsher 
interviews, use leading questions, and pressure the suspect to con-
fess. Finally, participants tended to believe that when suspects feel 
that they are being interviewed by a guilt-presumptive interviewer, 
they are likely to be more forthcoming but not to confess to the 
crime. Combined, the findings of Study IV demonstrate that lay peo-
ple hold some mistaken beliefs about innocent suspects’ alibis.
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GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
The aim of this thesis was to contribute to the neglected yet grow-
ing body of research on alibi provision by innocent suspects by ex-
ploring how providing an alibi can be improved for both suspects 
and police interviewers. The research presented here explored the 
effects of memory-based reporting instructions on the memory out-
put of innocent suspects when providing an alibi to convince police 
interviewers of their innocence as well as when reporting alibi-cor-
roborating evidence. I also examined the effects of one aspect of sus-
pect interviewing that may hamper innocent suspects’ memory out-
put during alibi provision, namely an interviewer’s presumption of 
guilt. Specifically, in three experimental studies and one exploratory 
survey, I examined the effects of pre-alibi instructions on the 
memory output of innocent mock suspects providing an alibi about 
their past actions (Study I) and evidence that might corroborate their 
alibi (Study II). Next, I examined how a presumption of guilt com-
municated to innocent mock suspects affected their memory output 
during alibi provision (Study III). Finally, I examined the beliefs and 
knowledge of members of the general public regarding alibi genera-
tion and provision by suspects, memory failures as a reason for in-
accuracies in innocent suspects’ alibis, and the issue of interviewers’ 
presumption of guilt (Study IV). In this section, I discuss the key 
findings in terms of theoretical and practical implications and exam-
ine the contributions of the findings with respect to the wider litera-
ture. I also discuss the limitations of this thesis and suggest routes 
for further research.  
 
Theoretical Implications  
The first step in the prosecution of suspects is an investigative 
interview to discover their potential knowledge of and involvement 
in an alleged crime. It is therefore surprising how little research has 
been conducted on specific questions about how alibis are generated 
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and provided. Even less research has been dedicated to developing 
interview protocols and testing whether they may improve the pro-
cess of alibi provision. Most research on the generation and provi-
sion of statements by people who might have been involved in a 
crime has concerned eyewitnesses and victims (e.g., Fisher, 1995; 
Fisher & Geiselman, 2010; Gabbert, Hope, & Fisher, 2009). How-
ever, while eyewitnesses or crime victims may not be harmed by 
providing inaccurate information, suspects whose statements are in-
accurate may be perceived by interviewers as deceptive (Burke, Tur-
tle, & Olson, 2007; Dysart & Strange, 2012; Olson & Charman, 
2012), and therefore more likely to be guilty. Ultimately, the unin-
tentional provision of inaccurate or incomplete information by sus-
pects may contribute to the wrongful conviction of innocent people 
(Crozier, Strange, & Loftus, 2017; Wells et al., 1998). 
 
A novel examination of suspect alibis. The research presented 
here is the first to develop and test memory-based reporting instruc-
tions (cf. retrieval cues; Leins & Charman, 2016) tailored specifi-
cally to be used during interviews with suspects. The findings of 
Study I and II are important as they suggest that innocent suspects’ 
memory output may be enhanced by guiding them to provide an ac-
curate and informative alibi. The findings of Study I that the alibis 
of guilty mock suspects were not affected by the pre-alibi instruc-
tions specifically suggest that memory-based reporting instructions 
may not assist guilty suspects in improving their accounts. The find-
ings of Study II that the enhanced instructions did not significantly 
improve the number of correct details provided overall or the number 
of correct evidence details provided suggest that the nuances of pre-
alibi instructions to innocent suspects are important. Indeed, adding 
the specific instruction to report accurately and informatively about 
alibi-corroborating evidence did not produce significantly more re-
ports of this type of detail. These findings indicate the important 
need to continue and study interview techniques that may actively 
improve innocent suspects’ memory output. 
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Study I, II, and III are also the first to examine suspect alibis in 
terms of the quantity and accuracy rates of the discrete details pro-
vided. Previous research on alibi provision has estimated alibi accu-
racy by testing whether participants reported in their alibi that, dur-
ing the critical time, they participated in the critical event rather than 
were engaged in another activity (Leins & Charman, 2016). Alterna-
tively, alibi accuracy has been estimated by examining whether par-
ticipants changed details between two alibis provided on two sepa-
rate occasions about the same time frame (Olson & Charman, 2012). 
While the examination of memory reports in terms of the quantity 
and accuracy of details have been conducted previously in the con-
text of eyewitness statements (e.g., Hope, Mullis, & Gabbert, 2013; 
Pansky & Nemets, 2012), no such examination has been conducted 
in the context of suspect alibis. The most appropriate approach to 
examining memory reports, especially freely-recalled information, 
is to analyse the quantity and accuracy rates of the details provided 
(Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996; See also Goldsmith, 2017). In the spe-
cific context of suspect alibis, during the investigation of an alibi, its 
details are compared against the ground truth available to the inter-
viewer. Studying alibis’ completeness and quality by directly com-
paring the suspect’s report of the event with actual event details pro-
vides a more naturalistic examination of alibis. While the ground 
truth may be difficult to establish in real-life investigations, pre-alibi 
instructions may assist in decreasing the danger of innocent suspects 
providing incorrect information that may be perceived by alibi eval-
uators as indicative of deception.  
Despite the differences between previous research and the present 
thesis in ways memory completeness and accuracy were examined, 
all of these examinations of alibi provision are important for devel-
oping the understudied body of research into the alibi generation and 
provision of innocent suspects. Especially relevant to the present the-
sis is Leins and Charman’s (2016) research, in which they demon-
strated that memory-based interview prompts (i.e., cued retrieval) 
may enhance alibi accuracy. The interview prompts used in that 
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study were intended to affect the memory search of participants such 
that it would accord with the specific cue presented. In contrast, the 
pre-alibi instructions used in Study I and II in the current thesis were 
intended to affect innocent suspects’ memory reporting, namely par-
ticipants’ decisions about what and how much information to report 
after this information has been retrieved. Future research may com-
bine the two interview techniques to examine the effects of pre-alibi 
instructions with the use of different types of specific cued retrieval 
on suspects’ memory output. Despite the difference between the in-
terview prompts used in the present research and in Leins and Char-
man (2016), all the interview prompts were designed based on 
memory theory, which is an important approach to improving inno-
cent suspects’ memory output during interviews.  
 
Enhancing suspects’ verbal output versus detecting decep-
tion. Some deception detection methods may lead innocent suspects 
to provide more information in their statements. For example, before 
interviewees provide their statement, presenting them with a model 
statement—a truthful account about an event unrelated to that they 
are interviewed about—should inform them of the level of detail that 
interviewers expect them to provide (Leal, Vrij, Warmelink, 
Vernham, & Fisher, 2015). Research has shown that providing inno-
cent and guilty mock suspects with a model statement before asking 
them to provide their statement can lead them to providing more in-
formation than if they do not have such prompt (e.g., Bogaard, Mei-
jer, & Vrij, 2014; Leal et al., 2015; Porter et al., 2018). In addition, 
Nahari, Vrij, and Fisher (2014) demonstrated that to encourage in-
nocent suspects to provide more verifiable details, they should be 
explicitly informed that their alibi will be examined for verifiability. 
However, because these deception detection methods were designed 
primarily to elicit cues to deception (cf. to enhance innocent sus-
pects’ memory output), the quality of the increased amount of infor-
mation resulting from these methods was not examined. Such exam-
ination is necessary to establish whether these deception detection 
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methods can be used as memory-enhancing interview techniques. In 
fact, in Study II of the present thesis, informing participants in the 
enhanced instructions condition that their alibi would be verified 
could have caused them to provide more (complete and accurate) 
evidence details than those provided by participants in the other con-
ditions. This should be examined in future research that includes an 
enhanced instructions condition in which participants are addition-
ally informed that the alibi evaluator intends to check the verifiabil-
ity of their alibis.  
While some deception detection methods may be used as 
memory-enhancing interview techniques, it may not be feasible to 
rely on cues to deception when providing memory-based reporting 
instructions. This notion is demonstrated by Study I whereby the pre-
alibi instructions did not affect the memory output of the guilty mock 
suspects, suggesting that when such instructions are used, guilty sus-
pects may not provide more detailed alibis that include more cues to 
deception (see Vrij, Mann, Kristen, & Fisher, 2007). Yet, while not 
increasing the memory output of the guilty mock suspects, none of 
the pre-alibi instructions used in Study I compromised the quantity 
of correct details provided by them (nor the accuracy of the details 
they provided). A subtle yet important difference between interview 
techniques aimed to increase innocent suspects’ memory output and 
those aimed to detect deception suggests that memory-based inter-
view techniques may need to undergo some changes to be useful for 
detecting deception. Specifically, memory-enhancing interview 
techniques focus more on guiding innocent suspects to provide an 
accurate and informative statement that may promote their exonera-
tion. In contrast, deception detection methods focus more on elicit-
ing cues to deception that may assist interviewers with deciding 
whether a suspect is lying when denying involvement in a crime 
(Vrij, 2008b). Nevertheless, if changes are made in memory-based 
interview techniques to allow them to be used to elicit cues to decep-
tion, the purpose of eliciting accurate and complete information must 
not be compromised by the purpose of detecting deception.  
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Combined, the findings reported in the present thesis suggest that 
further efforts should be dedicated to studying the process of alibi 
provision by innocent (and guilty) suspects. In particular, Study I 
and II suggest that when the goal of using interviewing techniques is 
to enhance the memory output of innocent suspects (as opposed to 
detecting deception), the development of pre-alibi instructions 
should take memory theory into consideration.  
 
Practical Implications 
The introduction of the PEACE interview model (Central Plan-
ning and Training Unit, 1992a, 1992b) was undoubtedly a crucial 
first step in improving the interview process of suspects in the UK. 
The change from the confession-seeking interrogation to the ethical 
interview to gather information was a positive step in attempting to 
decrease miscarriages of justice. Combined with allowing suspects 
to present their version of events and asking them to tell the inter-
viewer everything they did during the critical time frame of the al-
leged crime, this change likely improved the process of case investi-
gation (Griffiths & Milne, 2006; Shawyer, Milne, & Bull, 2009). 
However, the findings of the present thesis (Study I and II) suggest 
that merely asking suspects to describe events in their own words is 
not enough, and that interviewers may need to present suspects with 
specific memory-based reporting instructions to guide and enhance 
their memory output. Yet, it is too early to determine, based on the 
studies in the present thesis, what might be the optimal way to ask 
suspects to report about their past actions and whereabouts when 
providing an alibi. Further research is needed to structure the best 
memory-based pre-alibi instructions. The present findings do sug-
gest that asking innocent suspects to provide an accurate and in-
formative alibi should benefit them more than not asking them to do 
so. Such pre-alibi instructions do not require specific training and, as 
indicated in Study I, should not facilitate guilty suspects’ alibi pro-
vision. 
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Innocent suspects’ alibis and interviewers’ presumptions of 
guilt. The present research is the first to examine the effects of inter-
viewers’ presumptions of guilt on the completeness and accuracy of 
suspect alibis. Previous research has examined and demonstrated the 
effects of this presumption of guilt on the behaviour of the inter-
viewer during interviews with suspects, and, consequently, on the 
judgements of neutral perceivers about the veracity of the inter-
viewed mock suspects (Hill, Memon, & McGeorge, 2008; Kassin, 
Goldstein, & Savitsky, 2003). The present research expands these 
previous findings by showing that in short interactions with a guilt-
presumptive interviewer, innocent suspects succeed in remaining ac-
curate and informative when providing their alibi (Study III). These 
findings are not surprising considering that innocent suspects typi-
cally believe that their innocence can set them free (Hartwig, 
Granhag, & Strömwall, 2007; Kassin & Norwick, 2004; Vrij, 
Granhag, & Porter, 2010), and it is possible that this belief led par-
ticipants in the guilty-belief condition to be as informative as partic-
ipants in the innocent-belief condition. Thus, the findings of Study 
III embody yet another demonstration of the confidence innocent 
suspects have in the power of their innocence.  
At first glance, Study III may seem to suggest that a guilt-pre-
sumptive interviewer may have no effect on innocent suspects’ 
memory output in terms of the completeness and accuracy of their 
alibis. However, it would be a mistake to conclude from these find-
ings that interviewers do not have to follow the recommendation to 
avoid guilt presumptions. Interviewers are unlikely to change their 
initial guilt belief even if an innocent suspect behaves in contrast to 
their guilt expectation (see Darley & Fazio, 1980), and the persis-
tence of this guilt belief may affect further interactions with this sus-
pect. For example, a guilt-presumptive interviewer who has obtained 
a suspect’s alibi is likely to investigate the suspect’s story and may 
discover that the information the (innocent) suspect provided during 
the interview was correct. However, instead of attributing the sus-
pect’s verbal behaviour to the suspect’s actual innocence (see, e.g., 
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Darley & Fazio, 1980), the interviewer may continue to believe that 
the suspect is guilty and conduct further interviews and interactions 
with this suspect with that guilt belief intact. Therefore, the findings 
of Study III may be relevant only to short, non-recurring interactions 
with a guilt-presumptive interviewer, and an attempt should be made 
to replicate them.  
The findings of Study III provide some indirect support for the 
long-existing notion that interviewers should use more open-ended 
than close-ended interview prompts (Fisher, Milne, & Bull, 2011; 
Geiselman, Fisher, MacKinnon, & Holland, 1985, 1986). Close-
ended interview prompts are usually suggestive, confine the remem-
berer to choosing between a limited number of response options pre-
sented by the interviewer and to reply to each question, and encour-
age guessing (Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996; see also Lamb et al., 2003). 
In contrast, when open-ended interview prompts are used, remem-
berers are free to produce their own answers and report only the in-
formation they are confident that they remember (Koriat & Gold-
smith, 1996). Consequently, open-ended interview prompts encour-
age the provision of a narrative response, which is more complete 
and accurate compared with responses obtained with yes/no or 
forced-choice questions (Fisher et al., 2011; Geiselman et al., 1985; 
Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996; Lamb et al., 2003). In Study III, although 
some participants provided their alibi to a guilt-presumptive inter-
viewer, they were given the opportunity to provide their account 
freely, ultimately providing an alibi as informative and accurate as 
that of the rest of the participants. Thus, while a presumption of guilt 
may be difficult to avoid even with training (see Shawyer & Milne, 
2015), Study III suggests that using open-ended interview tech-
niques may protect innocent people from the effects of interviewers 
communicating their guilt presumption (although this was not di-
rectly tested in the current thesis). Future research may examine how 
pre-alibi instructions and interviewers’ presumptions of guilt affect 
innocent suspects’ memory output when these factors are manipu-
lated together.  
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The findings of Study III are more relevant to real-life interviews 
in which interviewers unintentionally communicate a guilt belief to 
suspects. However, in some cases, even if interviewers do not use 
accusatory interview techniques, they may be required by law to in-
form suspects of the degree of suspicion they are under. Such is the 
case in Sweden, where in accord with the Swedish Code of Judicial 
Procedure, police officers must inform suspects at the outset of the 
interview of the degree of suspicion they are under (see Granhag, 
Clemens, & Strömwall, 2009). This procedure is different from the 
implicit communication of a presumption of guilt examined in the 
current thesis. It is first necessary to determine whether the fact that 
interviewers inform suspects of the degree of suspicion they are un-
der affects the behaviour of the interviewers. Additionally, it could 
be examined how informing suspects of the level of suspicion affects 
their memory output when the interviewer who provides this infor-
mation is behaving in an innocence-presumptive, guilt-presumptive, 
or neutral manner.  
 
Lay people’s beliefs about suspect alibis. Previous surveys on 
suspect interviews conducted among lay people have examined par-
ticipants’ beliefs about cues that may differentiate truthful from de-
ceptive suspects (e.g., Akehurst, Köhnken, Vrij, & Bull, 1996; Masip 
& Herrero, 2015). The survey conducted in the present research 
(Study IV) is the first to examine lay people’s knowledge and beliefs 
about factors in the interview process itself with respect to how these 
factors might prevent innocent suspects from providing a convincing 
alibi.  
The findings of the survey are important in light of the complex 
nature of jury service, whereby citizens unfamiliar with legal matters 
are expected to assess the credibility of suspect alibis while exposed 
to a variety of other information (Bornstein & Greene, 2011; Greene 
& Bornstein, 2000; Porter & ten Brinke, 2009). The finding that par-
ticipants did not believe that innocent suspects may provide inaccu-
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rate alibis is another demonstration of prospective jurors’ lack of un-
derstanding of issues concerning psychology and law and is con-
sistent with previous findings that demonstrated this poor knowledge 
in lay people (e.g., Benton, Ross, Bradshaw, Thomas, & Bradshaw, 
2006; Simons & Chabris, 2011, 2012). For example, Benton et al. 
(2006) found that agreement between 111 jurors from the United 
States and 64 eyewitness experts on items about eyewitness issues 
(e.g., memory, weapon focus, and elderly witnesses) was obtained 
on only four (13%) of 30 items. This finding suggests that experts’ 
testimony may be required in court to educate jurors about the relia-
bility of, and how to evaluate, eyewitness testimony. The findings of 
the survey (Study IV) conducted for the present thesis add to this 
existing body of research by demonstrating that jurors may also ben-
efit from being explicitly informed that innocent suspects may pro-
vide inaccurate details despite being motivated to be accurate. The 
finding that participants believed that interviewers form a belief 
about suspects’ guilt or innocence before meeting them, but at the 
same time believed that interviewers may form this belief during the 
interview, suggests that jurors may also need to be explicitly in-
formed that suspects sometimes provide their alibi to a guilt-pre-
sumptive interviewer. This should be done especially when suspects 
complain that their interviewer treated them as if they had already 
decided that they were guilty, as in the case of Ronald Cotton (see 
Introduction).  
In sum, the findings reported in this thesis are encouraging in 
demonstrating that some types of pre-alibi instructions may assist 
innocent suspects to provide accurate and informative alibis and in-
terviewers to obtain complete and accurate reports from suspects. 
However, the need for further research prevents me from providing 
direct recommendations of how to apply these findings in real-life 
suspect interviews. At present, it may be suggested that interviewers 
continue to allow suspects to provide a free account of events, in 
their own words, without interrupting or giving feedback on the de-
tails as they are provided. Such open-ended prompts may also act as 
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a safeguard when interviewers approach the interview already be-
lieving that the suspect is guilty. For the sake of innocent suspects 
who fail to provide a convincing alibi, judges must not prevent 
memory and interview experts from discussing relevant research 
findings in court on the grounds that “such research would tell jurors 
little that they did not already know” (Kassam, Gilbert, Swencionis, 
& Wilson, 2009, p. 552). Because jurors play a crucial role in deter-
mining the fate of innocent people, they should be educated as much 
as possible prior to fulfilling their duty. 
 
Methodological Considerations and Future Directions 
To evaluate the reliability and informativeness of the findings ob-
tained, it is important to discuss the statistical power of the experi-
ments reported in this thesis. In Study I, the effect size obtained for 
the main effect of the pre-alibi instructions on the quantity measure 
among innocent mock suspects (f = 0.37) was medium-to-large (Co-
hen, 1988). Moreover, the effect size of the finding that information 
quantity was higher in the combined pre-alibi instructions condition 
than in the control condition was large (d = 0.99; Cohen, 1969). With 
respect to the main effect of the pre-alibi instructions on the number 
of overall correct details provided in Study II, the effect size (f = 
0.33) was medium (Cohen, 1988). Finally, the effect sizes of the 
findings in Study II that the quantity measure was higher in both the 
enhanced instructions condition (d = 0.72) and the task instructions 
condition (d = 0.67) than in the control condition were medium-to-
large and medium, respectively (Cohen, 1969). Effect sizes of this 
magnitude suggest that pre-alibi instructions can have a substantial 
effect in terms of increasing suspects’ memory output.  
In terms of statistical power, the sensitivity analysis conducted 
for Study I, which demonstrated that I could expect to detect a me-
dium effect size (f = 0.24) with reasonable power (80%), suggests 
that Study I was not substantially underpowered. However, Study I 
was likely underpowered for detecting an interaction between pre-
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alibi instructions and participants’ guilt, because the sample size re-
quired to detect interaction effects is typically larger than that re-
quired to detect main effects (see, e.g., Durand, 2013).  
In contrast to Study I, Study II and III were relatively less pow-
ered since the sensitivity analyses indicated that I could expect to 
detect medium-to-large and medium effect sizes (f = 0.36 and f = 
0.33), with 80% power, respectively. Turning to the Bayesian anal-
yses conducted, the finding of Study II that the quantity of evidence 
details did not differ between pre-alibi instruction conditions pro-
vided only anecdotal evidence in favour of the null hypothesis. In 
Study III, where the quantity of (overall) information provided did 
not differ between interviewer-belief conditions, the Bayesian anal-
yses provided moderate evidence in favour of the null hypothesis. 
Hence, although the Bayesian analyses suggest that these null find-
ings are more likely the results of the absence rather than the pres-
ence of actual effects, the support for the null hypotheses is nonethe-
less weak.  
In sum, while the magnitude of the effect sizes obtained for the 
specific effects in Study I and II is substantial, the reliability of the 
effect-size estimates in Study II and III is limited due to the modest 
sample sizes. Furthermore, the experimental studies in the current 
thesis were not adequately powered to detect medium or smaller ef-
fects, and it cannot be determined conclusively that the null findings 
obtained in the studies for this thesis reflect a genuine absence of the 
predicted effects. Thus, all three experimental studies should be rep-
licated using larger sample sizes. 
Because of the additional limitations outlined below, some find-
ings should be treated with caution.  
In Study I and II, calculating and analysing the quantity and ac-
curacy rates of participants’ alibis enabled me to draw conclusions 
about the effects of the pre-alibi instructions on participants’ 
memory output. However, these findings do not inform us why the 
pre-alibi instructions produced the effects they did. For example, 
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since I did not calculate participants’ report criterion, I cannot con-
clude whether monitoring and control processes produced the ob-
tained results. Alternatively, it may be that the higher quantity meas-
ure obtained among innocent mock suspects in the accuracy and in-
formativeness instructions condition (Study I) resulted from these 
participants engaging in a more thorough memory search than the 
control innocent mock suspects. Not knowing how the underlying 
mechanisms operated to produce participants’ alibis does not limit 
my conclusions; however, a better understanding of the process of 
alibi generation and provision may be obtained by learning about the 
operation of mechanisms that produce suspects’ memory output. To 
this end, future research on alibi generation should, for example, de-
velop a paradigm that would allow the calculation of innocent (and 
guilty) suspects’ report criterion to further examine the metacogni-
tive monitoring and control processes underlying alibi provision. 
This would require asking participants to report (i) their confidence 
in the correctness of the details reported; (ii) the details they retrieved 
but withheld (i.e., chose not to report), and; (iii) their confidence in 
the correctness of these withheld details (Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996). 
The present findings demonstrate the importance of including 
several experimental and control conditions to discover what aspects 
of manipulation enhance participants’ memory output. Accordingly, 
it is yet to be determined whether the enhanced performance in both 
experimental conditions in Study II compared with the control con-
dition was due to the fact that these experimental conditions in-
structed participants either (i) to report about certain types of details 
(i.e., past actions and corroborating evidence) or (ii) how to provide 
an accurate and informative alibi. It may also be that both types of 
instructions led to this result. We can also not rule out the possibility 
that participants found the task component and the evidence compo-
nent of the enhanced instructions very similar, resulting in no signif-
icant difference in the number of correct details provided between 
the task instructions and enhanced instructions conditions. 
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In hindsight, to disentangle such influences, I should have in-
cluded in Study II a condition in which participants would only be 
asked to report accurately and informatively about alibi-corroborat-
ing evidence, just as there was a condition in which participants were 
asked only to report accurately and informatively about their past 
actions. Including this individual evidence instructions condition 
would align with the procedure of Study I, in which there was a com-
bined accuracy and informativeness pre-alibi instructions condition 
as well as individual accuracy and informativeness instructions con-
ditions. It would also align with the procedure of Leins and Charman 
(2016), who included three conditions of recall cue to examine their 
effects on alibi accuracy: a time-only cue, a location-only cue, and a 
combined time-and-location cue. The inclusion of several experi-
mental and control conditions is important when attempting to de-
velop the most effective interviewing techniques to enhance inno-
cent suspects’ memory output and when seeking to discover the ef-
fects of other aspects of the interview (e.g., interviewers’ guilt pre-
sumption) on suspects’ verbal behaviour.   
A key element of the procedures used in the experimental studies 
of this thesis (i.e., Study I, II, and III) was that participants completed 
tasks under specific task instructions. This served my aim of com-
paring participants’ alibis with the critical event to calculate and an-
alyse the quantity of correct details and the accuracy rates of the al-
ibis. However, more realistic critical events might be used to study 
the quantity and accuracy of alibis and to replicate the findings of 
Study I. In addition, such research could examine the effects of the 
enhanced instructions used in Study II, with the inclusion of inform-
ing participants of the alibi evaluator’s intention to verify their alibis.  
In this context, it is worth commenting on the evidence items that 
participants were instructed to report about in Study II. Participants 
were asked to actively generate these evidence items so that the cod-
ing of evidence details would be cohesive across all participants. 
However, in real life, people do not go shopping specifically to ob-
tain a receipt or to communicate with a person who can later provide 
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evidence; these are by-products of people’s day-to-day actions. The 
effects of the pre-alibi instructions I used should be tested using a 
more authentic procedure in which evidence would be a by-product 
of participants’ actions (e.g., a receipt from a shop as object evidence 
and a guard in a shop as person evidence). Participants in future re-
search may also be asked to report about their past actions and the 
corroborating evidence one after the other or in separate interviews. 
Another aspect of the critical event (i.e., task completion) I ap-
plied in Study I and III concerns the location of the “crime”. Partic-
ipants in both studies were asked to report on their task completion 
to explain why they could not have committed a crime that was com-
mitted in the same location where they had completed the tasks. It 
could then be claimed that the statement that participants provided 
was not an alibi according to its common definition, “a defense that 
places the defendant at the relevant time of crime in a different place 
than the scene involved and so removed therefrom as to render it 
impossible for him to be the guilty party” (Black, 1990, p. 71). Alt-
hough a legitimate critique, it does not undermine the conclusions 
derived from these experiments. Importantly, in the three experi-
ments in which participants were asked to report about their past ac-
tions or/and corroborating evidence (Study I, II, and III), participants 
provided their statement to exonerate themselves, and this made the 
statement their alibi (see Burke et al., 2007). Moreover, when it was 
crucial that participants report evidence that supported their presence 
in a location different from that of the “crime scene” (Study II), I 
designed the procedure such that the task completion and the “crime” 
were in different locations.  
Participants in the studies presented in this thesis were asked only 
to provide specific information in the form of an alibi. Thus, the ef-
fects of the pre-alibi instructions and guilt presumption should be 
examined as part of a fuller interview, in which suspects are asked 
to provide an alibi and then reply to subsequent questions. For ex-
ample, the pre-alibi instructions tested in the current thesis could be 
examined when presented to innocent mock suspects as part of the 
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CI (Fisher & Geiselman, 2010; Fisher, Geiselman, & Amador, 
1989). Moreover, the performance of interviewees under the CI tech-
nique could be compared between those receiving pre-alibi instruc-
tions and those instructed to “report everything” in the CI. Such ex-
amination may reveal whether the combined accuracy and informa-
tiveness pre-alibi instructions, which were found to produce the rel-
atively best performance in the current thesis, are more or less ben-
eficial when preceded by other retrieval mnemonics.  
More generally, in the procedures used in the present thesis, the 
time interval between the critical event and alibi provision was rel-
atively short across all three experimental studies, and likely 
shorter than time intervals between real-life crimes and interviews. 
This short time interval may account for the high accuracy rates ob-
tained in Study I, II, and III. Nevertheless, drawing reliable conclu-
sions on any effects of the pre-alibi instructions and interviewers’ 
guilt presumption on participants’ memory output in these studies 
required that I eliminate any factors that could potentially interfere 
with the effects of these manipulations. The most likely factor to 
interfere would be memory contamination (see, e.g., Frenda, Nich-
ols, & Loftus, 2011; Loftus, Miller, & Burns, 1978; Tourangeau, 
2000). Memory contamination may result, for example, from infor-
mation that rememberers have been exposed to after the critical 
event. If such post-event information is incorrect, the rememberer’s 
own memory of the event is likely to be distorted, leading them to 
report incorrect event details when asked (Frenda et al., 2011). In 
the present thesis, such potential distortions would make it difficult 
to statistically detect the effects of the different manipulations. In 
fact, by administrating the time interval I did in Study III, I fol-
lowed previous research that tested the effects of interviewers’ pre-
sumption of guilt (e.g., Hill et al., 2008). Nevertheless, in future re-
search, Study I, II, and III should be replicated using longer time 
intervals. It may be that larger effects of the pre-alibi instructions 
would be observed in those studies, as these instructions are in-
tended to guide the memory retrieval of truthful rememberers.  
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Because of ethical constraints, in procedures that include mock 
suspects, participants are never accused of committing a real crime, 
and the crimes they are accused of are not particularly serious (typi-
cally thefts or minor infractions of rules; e.g., Hartwig et al., 2007; 
Vrij et al., 2009). For the same reason, the present research also in-
cluded accusations of relatively minor crimes (e.g., theft of a wallet). 
For the same ethical reasons, and also in accordance with previous 
research (e.g. Hartwig et al., 2007; Vrij et al., 2009), participants 
were told that if they succeeded in convincing the interviewer of their 
innocence, they would have a chance to receive a monetary prize or 
if they failed, they would be asked to hand-write a second alibi. 
Clearly, the repercussions of the interviewer’s judgement of the ve-
racity of the participants’ alibis are incomparable to the positive out-
come of being exonerated or negative outcome of being imprisoned 
(or worse) in real-life cases. With such real-life outcomes, the ma-
nipulations used in the three experimental studies of this thesis may 
result in different behaviours of innocent suspects than those ob-
served in the studies. For example, consider an innocent suspect fac-
ing a possible sentence of 15 years in prison for allegedly physically 
harming a person who is interviewed by a guilt-presumptive inter-
viewer. Experiencing the guilt-presumptive behaviour of the inter-
viewer and fearing the potential severe punishment may stun the sus-
pect into becoming less talkative than participants in the experi-
mental guilt-belief condition in Study III, ultimately supporting the 
interviewer’s belief. Future research may examine whether the at-
tractiveness of potential prizes and severity of potential punishments 
interact with interviewers’ belief-led behaviour or pre-alibi instruc-
tions in affecting innocent suspects’ memory output. 
Because Study II and III included only innocent suspects, the re-
sults of these studies are not informative about how guilty suspects 
respond to the manipulated variables. This limitation does not un-
dermine the informativeness of the current thesis’s findings about 
innocent suspects’ behaviour during interviews. Nevertheless, to de-
termine whether or not different interview techniques that increase 
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innocent suspects’ memory output also increase that of guilty sus-
pects, research on such techniques must also include a sample of 
guilty mock suspects.  
A limitation of the survey (Study IV) involves the use of the terms 
“truth-tellers” and “liars” as synonyms for “innocent suspects” and 
“guilty suspects”, respectively. Admittedly, guilty suspects may 
speak the truth and innocent suspects may lie in police interviews. 
Although suspects’ veracity and guilt are probably correlated in real 
life, one cannot be certain that respondents’ reported beliefs about 
truth-tellers and liars correspond perfectly with their beliefs about 
innocent and guilty suspects, respectively. In future surveys on the 
topic, researchers should take great care to use the exact terms to 
which they intend to generalize their findings. 
Finally, it cannot be determined from the findings of the survey 
whether participants would consider the factors of impaired memory 
processes and interviewers’ presumptions of guilt if asked to evalu-
ate the credibility of a suspect’s alibi in court. Future research on lay 
people’s beliefs about issues concerning alibi provision may include 
additional questions about this process while examining partici-
pants’ decision-making process during an evaluation of a mock alibi. 
To conclude, future research on alibi generation should apply 
more naturalistic procedures than those used in the present research. 
Nevertheless, this should not be done at the expense of being able to 
draw direct conclusions about the effects of the manipulations on the 
examined measures. Drawing more accurate conclusions on the ef-
fects of manipulations on suspect-participants’ memory output may 
be achieved by ensuring experimental control through eliminating 
factors that may interfere with the effects of the examined manipu-
lations. 
 
Conclusions 
In three experimental studies and one survey, the present thesis 
examined the process of alibi provision by innocent suspects to fur-
ther understand this process and discover ways to improve it. The 
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findings of the present research demonstrate that specific memory-
based reporting instructions presented to innocent suspects prior to 
alibi provision may increase their memory output. These findings 
suggest that such instructions should be carefully designed to en-
courage innocent suspects to provide information of the required 
type and level of completeness and quality. The present research also 
demonstrates that innocent suspects’ memory output may not be sen-
sitive to the guilt-driven behaviour of the interviewer during short 
interviews, but it warrants that guilt presumptions must still be 
avoided. Lastly, the findings of the survey demonstrate that lay peo-
ple hold some mistaken beliefs about factors that may hamper inno-
cent suspects’ ability to provide accurate alibis. Future research 
should establish whether lay people consider these factors when 
serving on a jury. Despite the various limitations outlined above, the 
procedures used in the present thesis were designed to ensure that 
the conclusions drawn from the obtained results would be reliable 
and accurate. The current thesis paves the way to further theoretical 
and practical research on alibi provision by innocent suspects, and 
particularly on factors that can improve (and might challenge) this 
process. The future of alibi research is exciting yet challenging, as 
much additional research is required to reveal more factors that are 
involved in and underlie the suspects’ provision of alibis. 
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